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Abstract 
Survey respondents were asked to provide knowledge responses to public events and names 
that occurred as long ago as the 1930s and as recently as the 1980s. Respondents made errors 
that reflect the use of semantic and lexical memory systems, and reconstructive processes 
based on a semantic theme. Errors, as well as correct responses, are affected by whether 
the events originally occurred during the transition phase (early teens to mid-twenties). 
Responses indicate that events that occur during the transition phase are remembered 
better than events that occur during other life phases (in contradiction to the differential 
sampling hypothesis), but that events that occur during the transition phase can also 
promote error-prone reporting by interfering with other events or by promoting inaccurate 
reconstructions. The evidence suggests that the transition phase is not a monolithic entity, 
but that young adolescence differs from older transition phase ages by having a greater 
concentration on determining general properties of the world. Support is strongest for 
cognitive accounts of transition phase effects such as the first experience hypothesis, and 
results challenge physiological and evolutionary accounts that are tied to the transition 
phase promoting better memory. Finally, the more dramatic observed errors (such as 
inverting the subject and object of an event) point to possible undocumented instances of 
autobiographical misremembering. 
Introduction 
Many students of autobiographical memory have a particular interest in John Dean, 
Richard Nixon’s counsel during the Watergate scandal, because Dean’s memory 
of some of the events surrounding Watergate has been used as an instructive 
case study (Neisser, 1981). Dean was found, not only to provide some faithful 
descriptions of events, but he also made errors that offered insight into the manner 
in which events are conceptualized and prioritized in memory. In this paper, we 
continue to explore the contribution that John Dean provides to an increased 
understanding of autobiographical memory, though we are not interested in 
Dean’s own memory. Rather, we focus on the errors that a representative sample 
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of adult Americans make while remembering John Dean, other public figures such 
as Joe McCarthy, and national events such as the Tet Offensive.
In examining respondent errors, we started with two interests. First, we sought 
to identify the different types of errors that were made, in order to gain insight 
into the basic memory processes that lead to error-prone reports. Second, in an 
extension of prior work (Schuman, Belli and Bischoping, 1997) that found age-
related cohort effects with correct responses, we sought to determine whether 
cohort effects also occur with errors.
Different error types
We observed a variety of errors in people’s reports, and document several types. 
First, it is important to acknowledge that some responses were not actually 
wrong, but were initially classified as errors because they did not fit the intended 
target of the investigators. For example, when asked about Joe McCarthy, some 
respondents reported not the notorious Senator from the 1950s, but a New York 
Yankees baseball manager from the 1940s, and in trying to identify Woodstock, 
some reported a cartoon character rather than a 1969 rock concert. Second, some 
erroneous responses seemed to reflect guesses that were constructed by using 
phrases or words in the question as lexical cues that were then associated with 
some unrelated event with which they were familiar. For example, a number 
of people when asked about John Dean remembered the actor James Dean and 
others remembered the singer Jimmy Dean. Third, some errors were semantically 
related to the target but referred to events that occurred either at an earlier or 
later time, such as people reporting the Vietnam War’s Tet Offensive of the 1960s 
to be part of the Korean conflict of the 1950s or the Iraqi–American conflict of 
1990. Fourth are errors that included the important components of an event but 
inverted the subject– object relationship, such as respondents who remembered 
Joe McCarthy, the senator who sought to expose communists, as a senator who 
was accused of being a communist! Other error types will also be identified. Like 
the errors in John Dean’s memory of the Watergate affair, the errors that people 
make in remembering public events across the lifespan are instructive regarding 
how memory serves to conceptualize and prioritize the world. 
Lifespan memory: transition phase effects 
Another of our primary interests in exploring respondent errors is to gain additional 
insight into age trend effects found with lifespan memory. An important discovery 
in lifespan memory research is that events that occur during the life transition from 
childhood to adulthood (early teens to middle twenties, hereafter referred to as the 
transition phase) are more often remembered than events that occur during other 
phases of people’s lives, with the exception of very recent events. This transition 
phase effect has been found with a number of different approaches. Some of these 
studies have provided subjects with cue words (e.g. cat, flag) and instructions to 
revive an autobiographical experience to each word (Fitzgerald and Lawrence, 
1984; Franklin and Holding, 1977; Rubin, Wetzler and Nebes, 1986; Zola-Morgan, 
Cohen and Squire, 1983). In studies without cue words, Fitzgerald (1988) found 
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a tendency to remember events that occurred during the transition phase when 
subjects (aged 62–75 years) were simply asked to report on three vivid memories 
that came to mind, and Fromholt and Larsen (1991) replicated this transition phase 
concentration when they asked elderly subjects (aged 71–89 years) to provide a 
15-minute free narrative report on their important life events. The transition phase 
effect has also been discovered in the recall of public rather than personal events. 
Survey respondents, representing all adult ages, and who live in diverse areas 
such as the United States and Lithuania, when asked to report on the two most 
important national or world events or changes that have occurred in the last 50 
years, tend to report events that fall within the transition phase (Schuman, Rieger 
and Gaidys, 1994; Schuman and Scott, 1989). 
Rubin et al. (1986) sought to explain the transition phase effect by an appeal 
to a differential sampling hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the transition 
phase is particularly rich for reminiscing about one’s past, perhaps because the 
transition phase is most important with respect to the formation of one’s identity 
in comparison to other phases of the lifespan (see also Fitzgerald, 1988). In memory 
tasks that emphasize reviving autobiographical experience, focusing on one’s “life 
story” would encourage the retrieval of those experiences that are formative, since 
without them, the thematic aspects of such a narrative would not be compelling 
(Robinson and Hawpe, 1986). Support for this view partly comes from noting 
that when the tasks do not necessarily require the revival of personal experiences, 
such as those studies (Fitzgerald, 1988; Fromholt and Larsen, 1991) that ask only 
for vivid or important memories, what is recalled overwhelmingly tends to be 
personal rather than public events. Personal events are more descriptive of oneself 
than public ones. Moreover, even when the task requires the recall of public 
events (e.g. Schuman and Scott, 1989), these events are often seen as important 
with respect to their personal relevance. As an example, World War II was often 
mentioned because of particular personal experiences associated with the war 
(e.g. being injured). Public events then, are often seen as associated with personal 
experience, perhaps because, as suggested by Neisser (1982, 1988) with respect 
to “flashbulb” memories,” they can serve as a means to associate one’s own life 
history with History writ large. Indeed, Schuman and Scott (1989) report that 
flashbulb memories of the Kennedy assassination came especially from those in 
their transition phase at the time the assassination took place. 
An important point to emphasize about the differential sampling hypothesis is 
that no role is assigned to the possibility that events that occur during the transition 
phase are actually known better than events that occur during other phases of 
the lifespan (Rubin et al., 1986), with the exception of infantile amnesia. That is, 
according to the hypothesis, events are seen as being encoded equally well, and 
the same rate of forgetting is seen to be maintained, throughout the lifespan. The 
transition effect then, is solely attributed to a bias in the sampling of memories 
during retrieval. The survey data may best illustrate this point. Consider someone 
who experienced WWII during the transition phase, and who also reported WWII 
but not the Vietnam War on the survey as one of two most important events that 
had occurred during the last 50 years. Would this necessarily mean that such an 
individual failed to encode Vietnam as thoroughly as WWII, or retained a memory 
of Vietnam less well than a memory for WWII? Of course not. In fact, if directly 
asked about Vietnam such an individual might have quite good knowledge of the 
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event. According to the differential sampling hypothesis, the person only had a 
bias to select WWII over Vietnam because WWII was more easily reminisced. 
However, evidence that the Vietnam War is better known by those who had 
experienced it during the transition phase has been recently provided by Schuman 
et al. (1997). In this study, survey respondents were asked directly to say what 
the Tet Offensive was and also what the village of Mylai referred to. Both events 
occurred during the Vietnam War, the former in 1968 and the latter in 1969. The 
authors found that survey respondents who experienced the Vietnam War during 
their transition phase demonstrated greater knowledge of the specific events in 
comparison with those individuals who were younger than the transition phase 
(or not alive at that point) when these events occurred, and more importantly, 
greater knowledge than those individuals who were older than their transition 
phase when the Vietnam War occurred. A similar transition effect was found for 
WPA, Marshall Plan, Joe McCarthy, and Woodstock, although no transition effect 
was found for direct questions about Watergate, John Dean, or Christa McAuliffe. 
Rubin (1995) also found that people have greater knowledge and memory for 
events that occur during the transition phase. 
Unlike the other transition phase effects, these results of Schuman et al. (1997) 
and Rubin (1995) cannot be explained by an appeal to the differential sampling 
hypothesis. According to the differential sampling hypothesis, people who are 
older than the transition phase should know (i.e. encoded and retained) events 
such as the Vietnam War as well as those individuals who experienced the Vietnam 
War during the transition phase. When asked direct questions about certain 
events of the war, which serve to sample these events from others that would be 
stored in memory, differential sampling no longer applies. Thus, the hypothesis 
would predict an equal ability to remember these events regardless of whether 
they occurred during or after the transition phase. The transition effect found by 
Schuman et al. (1997) suggests that other memory factors besides retrieval and 
sampling, such as encoding and retention factors, also have a role in the effect. 
Since the data collected by Schuman et al. (1997) consist of reports of verifiable 
public events, they are unique in transition effect studies by providing an 
opportunity to also examine the errors in people’s autobiographical reports. Most 
of the other data revealing a transition effect consist of reports of unverifiable 
personal experiences. Thus, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the extent 
to which these reports are accurate or fraught with error. As in John Dean’s case, 
these remembrances may include a certain degree of confabulation (Neisser, 
1981). In this paper, we will report analyses of errors that will illustrate, among 
other things, that the transition phase is also a major contributor to error-prone 
reporting. 
In an initial limited analysis of errors, Schuman et al. (1997) found that 
individuals who experienced the Korean War during their transition phase were 
more likely to report the Tet Offensive as having occurred during the Korean War 
than did other individuals. For this cohort the Korean War apparently serves as a 
transition phase experience that can overshadow the ability to remember Vietnam 
War events. In other words, transition phase experiences have the capacity to 
proactively interfere with the remembering of later similar events. This paper 
provides a fuller and more systematic analysis of respondent errors, which reveal 
other examples of these transition phase effects. 
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Our analyses of errors extends understanding regarding the processes involved 
in remembering across the lifespan. We show that errors in the attempt to remember 
past events involving the use of both semantic and lexical memory systems, can 
result from proactive and possibly from retroactive interference, and reveal age 
trends in which certain types of errors are more likely in particular cohorts. 
Method
Respondents 
All respondents were 18 years of age and older and were interviewed in one of two 
standard surveys. First, the Detroit Area Study was conducted in 1991 (DAS-91) 
through face-to-face interviews of a probability sample of adults, drawn from the 
Detroit Metropolitan area. DAS-91 had a 78.1% response rate and a final sample 
size of 1042 individuals. Second, as part of a national telephone survey conducted 
through random-digit dialing, the University of Michigan’s Survey Research 
Center interviewed a cross-section of approximately 500 adults during each of 
5 consecutive months in 1993 (SRC-93). The sample for each month of the SRC-
93 consisted of approximately 300 new cases, and 200 individuals who had been 
interviewed 6 months earlier (but not with the questions reported in this paper). 
There was a 69.6% response rate for the new respondents over the 5 months of 
interviewing with SRC-93. As probability samples, both surveys had a full range 
of American adults in terms of age, sex, and other demographic factors, though 
the Detroit survey had a higher percentage of black respondents and, of course, 
did not represent the different regions of the country as did the national survey. 
However, in Schuman et al. (1997) it is evident that the two surveys produced 
comparable results except where racial issues were concerned. 
Procedure 
Mid-way in the interviews in both surveys, respondents were told: This next 
section concerns a few words and names from the past that come up now and 
then, but that many people have forgotten. Could you tell me which ones you 
have heard of at all, and, if you have, what they refer to in just a few words? 
Respondents participating in DAS-91 were each given nine items that represented 
distinct events that happened as long ago as a U.S. government sponsored work 
program of the 1930s (the “WPA”), and as recently as the 1986 explosion of the 
Challenger space-shuttle (“Christa McAuliffe”). The other seven items were 
the Holocaust, the Marshall Plan (the U.S. government plan for the economic 
reconstruction of Germany following WWII), Joe McCarthy (a U.S. Senator of 
the 1950s who accused many prominent individuals of being communists), Rosa 
Parks (a black women, who, in the 1950s, protested segregation in Montgomery, 
Alabama, by refusing to move to the back of a bus), the Tet Offensive (the Vietnam 
War offensive by North Vietnamese troops against American forces), Woodstock 
(the 1969 outdoor rock concert that was a high point of the 1960s counter-
cultural movement), and Watergate (the symbol of a series of events that led to 
the resignation of Richard Nixon from the U.S. Presidency). The SRC-93 survey 
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asked each respondent two to four items, with a total of four items being asked 
overall. Two of these four items (Tet Offensive and Woodstock) were replications 
of items asked earlier in DAS-91, and two were new items: the village of Mylai (the 
Vietnamese village that was the scene of atrocities carried out by American troops) 
and John Dean (a key figure in the Watergate scandal). Thus, altogether, there was 
a total of 11 different items, as well as a replication of two of these. In both surveys, 
additional questions obtained information about the respondents’ age and other 
demographic variables. 
Table 1 gives the number of respondents asked each of the 11 items, the survey 
used, and the approximate date of occurrence for each event. The number of 
respondents asked each item in the SRC-93 surveys varies (from 1,008 to 2,001) 
because for most months a subset of the 4 items were asked. 
Results and Discussion 
Respondent reports were coded as correct, partly correct, or wrong (including 
don’t know responses) in analyses reported by Schuman et al. (1997). For the 
analyses presented here, correct and partly correct responses were combined and 
simply considered as correct. In addition, the initially coded wrong responses 
were recoded as being either don’t know responses (DKs) or substantive errors. 
The recoding scheme did not affect the pattern of findings originally reported by 
Schuman et al., and facilitated comparability among correct responses, substantive 
error responses, and DKs, since all types of responses were made to assume the 
same range of values (occurrence or non-occurrence). For each of the items, Table 1 
presents the proportion of correct, error and DKs, following the recoding scheme.
In comparing substantive errors with DKs, the proportion of errors tends to be 
rather low and ranges from 1.3% to 12.9%, whereas the DKs are much more frequent 
ranging from 9.7% to 73.3%. The much greater frequency of DKs is probably the 
result of question wording that encourages DKs: respondents were first asked 
Table 1. Distribution of types of responses
Item  Survey  Valid N  Date of event  % Correct  % DKs  % Errors
WPA DAS-91 1033 1938 37.0 61.5 1.5
Holocaust DAS-91 1032 1945 76.1 18.5 5.4
Marshall Plan DAS-91 1033 1947 20.6 73.3 6.1
Joe McCarthy DAS-91 1032 1954 35.8 51.4 12.9
Rosa Parks DAS-91 1033 1955 78.9 16.9 4.1
Tet Offensive SRC-93 2000 1968 33.5 61.6 5.0
Tet Offensive DAS-91 1032 1968 28.7 67.4 3.9
Village of Mylai SRC-93 1008 1969 35.4 63.1 1.5
Woodstock SRC-93 2001 1969 74.3 21.2 4.4
Woodstock DAS-91 1033 1969 73.1 21.8 5.1
John Dean SRC-93 1511 1973 32.6 57.2 10.3
Watergate DAS-91 1033 1973 85.3 9.7 5.0
Christa McAuliffe DAS-91 1033 1986 50.6 48.1 1.3
Mean percent    50.9 44.0 5.1
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whether they heard of the words or names before providing a substantive response. 
In opinion research, the technique of asking respondents first if they are familiar 
with an issue before providing an opinion is known as providing a DK filter, and 
has been shown to increase DKs in comparison to opinion questions in which a 
DK filter is not used (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick, 1986; Schuman and 
Presser, 1981).With our items, the DK filter was apparently effective in discouraging 
respondents from providing a substantive response when they felt that there was a 
lack of familiarity with an item, though it is also likely that admissions of ignorance 
occur much more readily with knowledge questions than with opinion questions. 
That error responses reflected attempts by respondents to provide a correct 
response was indicated by an examination of answers to DAS-91, in which all 
respondents were presented with nine items. We were concerned that errors could 
have been made primarily by a tiny subset of respondents who simply were willing to 
guess wildly. If this were true, then there should be an identifiable set of respondents 
who provided errors to many items and who also did not provide correct responses 
to the remaining items. No such pattern emerged. Over one-third (35.3%, N = 365) 
of the DAS-91 respondents provided errors. Further, the majority of the respondents 
who provided errors had only a single error, and only one respondent made as many 
as four errors (and this person also provided two correct responses). More generally, 
respondents who provided errors also tended to provide correct responses to other 
items. Only eight respondents who provided errors did not have any items correct, 
and of these, seven respondents had just one error and the remaining person had 
two errors. Thus, the data revealed that, in general, when people were responding 
with errors they were doing so with an attempt to provide a correct response. 
Types of errors 
In reviewing the substantive errors, we developed a coding scheme that categorized 
errors within three independent classification systems: basic, time and name errors. 
All errors were assessed within each classification system. 
(1) Basic errors 
For basic errors, we developed a coding scheme that differentiated the content 
of responses into six mutually exclusive types: quasi-correct, related event, loose 
association, inversion, vague, and uninterpretable. The coding operation consisted 
of two phases. In the first phase, the first two authors, working together, coded 
error responses to Joe McCarthy, Rosa Parks, John Dean, and Watergate. During 
this first phase, we were able to determine the kinds of basic codes and the criteria 
by which responses could be assigned to them. In the second phase, the first two 
authors independently coded responses to Woodstock (DAS-91 and SRC-93), 
Tet Offensive (DAS-91 and SRC-93), Mylai, Holocaust, WPA, Marshall Plan, and 
Christa McAuliffe, and reached an agreement level of 77.4%. Discrepancies were 
resolved through discussion. 
The basic errors coding scheme and criteria are as follows: 
(a) Quasi-correct errors were not actually wrong on the part of the respondents, 
but indicated the restricted version of the investigators initially as to what should 
be a correct response. For example, we assumed that the only possible correct 
answer to Joe McCarthy would be to refer to the Wisconsin Senator who gained 
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notoriety for his pursuit of communists. Yet in retrospect it is clear that responses 
referring to a “New York Yankees manager” should be considered legitimate. 
(b) Related event errors referred to an event that was conceptually or semantically 
related to the target event, by belonging to the same general category, but which 
were nevertheless clearly incorrect (e.g. identifying an event from the Vietnam 
War as part of the Korean War). 
(c) Loose association errors were those that used some word or phrase in the 
question (such as the last name of the cued individual or the word “offense” in 
“Tet Offensive”) to construct a response, though a response that was incorrect. If 
a response could be categorized as either a related event or loose association, the 
response was considered a loose association. As a notable example, some errors 
to John Dean referred to a “secretary of state,” whom we infer was Dean Rusk. 
Since Dean Rusk is conceptually related to John Dean in that both figures had 
Table 2. Examples of basic error responses
Error/
 Item  Response
Quasi-correct/
 Holocaust  The atomic bomb on Japan
 Joe McCarthy  Manager of New York Yankees
 Rosa Parks  Changed 12th to Rosa Parks
 Woodstock  Charlie Brown’s bird
Related event/
 Marshall Plan  Divided up Berlin and all the goodies after WWII
 Tet Offensive  During the Korean War the last charge to win the war
 Village of Mylai  A Korean village
 Woodstock  Peace protest
Loose association/
 WPA  World Peace Association
 Joe McCarthy  WWII, “we shall return”
 John Dean  Movie star killed in an automobile accident
 Christa McAuliffe  A tennis player
 Tet Offensive  The line in football where you have 3 backs and you split a
  wide receiver off to the right. A handoff to the running back
Inversion/
 Joe McCarthy  They thought he was a communist but it was never proven
 Rosa Parks  Gave up her seat on the bus
 Tet Offensive  A major offensive when they started using B52 bombers
 Watergate  The break-in to recover tapes
Vague/
 Holocaust  What a hell
 Joe McCarthy  Political figure
 Rosa Parks  A black woman
 Watergate  Scandal
Uninterpretable/
 WPA  Should have never existed. Ridiculous
 Holocaust  I hated the burning
 Tet Offensive  Preacher in the pulpit, sinners
 Woodstock  A name brand for a canned food
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been administration officials, these errors could have been appropriately coded as 
related events. Yet, given that the word Dean also motivated respondents to think 
of Dean Rusk, it was decided to code these errors as loose associations. Similar 
thinking led to those who referred to a 1960s Presidential candidate to the item Joe 
McCarthy (i.e., Eugene McCarthy) to be coded as loose associations. 
(d) Inversion errors are particularly interesting in that respondents inverted the 
subject and object of the event. For example, there were responses that claimed 
Rosa Parks gave up her seat on a bus, the opposite of what actually happened, and 
that Joe McCarthy was known for having been accused of being a communist! 
(e) Vague errors were those that may have referred to the target or quasi-correct 
event, but respondents did not provide enough information to determine accuracy 
(e.g. responding simply with the word “scandal” to Watergate). 
(f) Uninterpretable errors were those errors whose referent we were not able to 
determine. 
Table 2 provides examples of actual error responses that we observed and 
how these responses were coded. For some of these responses and codes, further 
explanation will be helpful. With regard to quasi-correct responses, Rosa Parks 
was a DAS-91 item, and responses of “12th” referred to the name of a Detroit street 
that was changed to honor Rosa Parks, a Detroit resident. In the loose associations, 
one of our more amusing responses was this detailed description of an offensive 
football play, which was apparently provided with a great deal of conviction! 
Regarding inversions, the Tet Offensive was actually an offensive by the North 
Vietnamese against American troops, but the reverse was often what was recalled. 
Finally, we coded responses as uninterpretable if, with our limited knowledge, 
we could not fathom a referent for the response: for example, it would not be a 
surprise if some informed readers were able to confirm that Woodstock is a brand 
name of a canned food (although there was only one such response). 
Table 3 presents the relative frequencies of occurrence of the different basic errors 
for each item. Most striking is that related events and loose associations were the 
most common type of errors, in combination accounting for over half of all errors. 
The predominance of these error types is probably an indication of the reliance that 
respondents have on using semantic and lexical memory systems, respectively. Also 
notable is that both Tables 2 and 3 reveal that each kind of basic error was not unique 
to any one item: for example, inversion errors occurred with four different items (Joe 
McCarthy, Rosa Parks, Tet Offensive, and Watergate). The discovery of inversion 
errors has been one of the unique contributions of our analyses. 
(2) Time errors 
There were instances in which people reported events that, in addition to 
receiving basic codes, clearly indicated a reference to an event that occurred either 
earlier or later in time than the target event. Thus, the codes earlier time and later 
time were used to refer to responses that were mistakenly associated with earlier 
or later historical times, respectively. For example, one subject responded to the 
Watergate item by mentioning a big scandal over a bridge, we inferred that this 
response referred to Ted Kennedy and the Chappaquiddick accident, which 
occurred earlier in time than the Watergate scandal. 
Table 4 provides the distribution of time errors. Overall, approximately one-
fifth of all errors involved either an earlier or later time displacement, and for some 
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of the items that involved names of individuals (e.g. Joe McCarthy, John Dean and 
Rosa Parks) nearly half of the errors could be coded also as time errors. It is notable 
that no single factor can account for the dominance of time errors within these 
items. Time errors were observed with three kinds of basic errors, quasi-correct, 
related event, and loose association errors,1 and as seen in Table 3, the proportion 
of respondents committing these basic errors differed depending on the item. Each 
item, then, invites processes that are unique to it. There is an observable tendency, 
shown in Table 4, for older events (e.g. Joe McCarthy, Rosa Parks) to promote 
later time errors and for more recent events (Tet Offensive, village of Mylai, John 
Dean) to promote earlier time errors. This is due simply to the fact that for older 
target events most of our respondents experienced a greater number of subsequent 
events in comparison to events that had occurred even earlier than these older 
target events, and for more recent target events, most respondents experienced 
other events that had happened longer ago than events that had happened even 
more recently than these recent target events. 
(3) Name errors 
Some errors were clearly in reference to a particular individual or event that 
we could confidently name. Table 5 presents the name errors that we found, and 
how they were cross-referenced with basic and time errors. To the DAS-91 item 
Joe McCarthy, we received five responses that referred to a New York Yankees 
baseball manager during the 1930s and 1940s (Yankee Manager), to a U.S. Army 
General who served both during WWII and the Korean conflict (N = 15; Douglas 
MacArthur), to a 1968 Presidential candidate (N = 6; Eugene McCarthy) and a 
musician associated with the 1960s band the Beatles (N = 2; Paul McCartney), 
which we collapsed for purposes of age-trend analyses (see below) into the name 
1 By their nature, inversion, vague, and uninterpretable errors are not open for time errors. Inversion 
errors refer to the target event, and vague and uninterpretable responses would not clearly indicate 
referring to a particular point in time. 
Table 4. Total number of errors, and distribution of time errors as percentages of all 
errors, for each item in DAS-91 and SRC-93
Item N % Earlier time  % Later time  % Total time
WPA (DAS) 16 0.0 0.0 0.0
Holocaust (DAS) 56 0.0 0.2 0.2
Marshall Plan (DAS) 63 9.5 12.7 22.2
Joe McCarthy (DAS) 133 15.8 36.8 52.6
Rosa Parks (DAS) 42 4.8 35.7 40.5
Tet Offensive (SRC) 99 29.3 4.0 33.3
Tet Offensive (DAS) 40 25.0 0.0 25.0
Mylai (SRC) 15 26.6 0.0 26.6
Woodstock (SRC) 89 3.4 2.2 5.6
Woodstock (DAS) 53 0.0 0.0 0.0
John Dean (SRC) 155 43.2 7.1 50.3
Watergate (DAS) 52 3.8 9.6 13.5
McAuliffe (DAS) 13 15.4 0.0 15.4
Mean percent  13.6 8.3 21.9
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error Sixties, to a Detroit area radio-host (N = 22; J. P. McCarthy), and finally, to 
a Detroit-area television news anchor (N = 16; Jack McCarthy). To the SRC-93 
item Tet Offensive we received 8 error responses that referred to WWII and 18 
Korean War responses; the DAS-91 Tet Offensive item mirrored this pattern with 
3 WWII and 5 Korea responses. The SRC-93 village of Mylai item also received 1 
WWII and 3 Korea errors. Finally, to the SRC-93 item John Dean, we received 14 
responses about a Secretary of State (at times including reference to the Kennedy 
administration), which we primarily coded as Dean Rusk (but we are also aware of 
Dean Acheson); there were 49 responses to a 1950s movie actor who was killed in 
an automobile accident (James Dean), 14 responses referred to a singer who is also 
known for sausage advertisements (Jimmy Dean), and 9 responses that blended 
elements of James and Jimmy Dean (James/Jimmy confusion). 
In the majority of cases, for those name errors that were cross-referenced as 
loose association errors, the respondents failed to explicitly recognize that they 
were referring to someone who had a first (and even last) name other than the 
presented item. For example, we received many responses to Joe McCarthy 
(“he ran for President in the 60s”) and John Dean (“he was a movie star killed 
in automobile accident”) that were simply descriptive of an unnamed though 
identifiable (and incorrect) individual. In other cases, respondents did recognize 
the name of the mistaken individual, but only after substantive comments that 
indicated that an error had already been made (e.g. “he was Secretary … of State 
under … Kennedy, … that was Dean Rusk”). These responses illustrate that the 
presentation of items cued respondents to gain access to associated information in 
lexical (and/or semantic) memory, but that the activated information, although 
containing relevant content, was nevertheless lacking in the critical ability to 
identify correctly what was being retrieved. 
Table 5. Name errors cross-referenced with basic errors and time errors in DAS-91 and 
SRC-93
Item/
 Name error  Basic error  Time error
Joe McCarthy (DAS)/
 Yankee Manager  Quasi-correct  Earlier time
 Douglas MacArthur  Loose association  Earlier time
 Sixties  Loose association  Later time
 J.P. McCarthy  Quasi-correct  Later time
 Jack McCarthy  Loose association  Later time
Tet Offensive (SRC and DAS)
 World War II  Related event  Earlier time
 Korean War  Related event  Earlier time
Village of Mylai (SRC)
 World War II  Related event  Earlier time
 Korean War  Related event  Earlier time
John Dean (SRC)
 Dean Rusk  Loose association  Earlier time
 James Dean  Loose association  Earlier time
 Jimmy Dean  Loose association  None
 James/Jimmy confusion  Loose association  None
auto B i o g r a p h i c al mi S r eme m B er i n g: Jo h n De an iS no t alo n e     199
Age-trends 
As reported by Schuman et al. (1997), there were distinct age-trends in the correct 
responses of 7 of the 11 different items that were presented to respondents in DAS-91 
and SRC-93. For example, those correctly identifying the WPA as a 1930s government 
program to provide employment during the Great Depression had a modal age of 
70–74 in the 1991 survey, which meant that they had been 17–21 in 1938 at the height 
of the program. Furthermore, the overall age-trend for knowledge of the WPA was 
essentially monotonic, with decreasing knowledge at younger ages in 1991. On 
the other hand, those most knowledgeable about the Tet Offensive were 45–49 in 
the 1993 national survey, which placed them in their early 20s when the Offensive 
occurred. Moreover, in this case the overall association of age to knowledge was 
curvilinear, with less knowledge shown both by those who were younger and by 
those who were older than the 45– to 49-year-old cohort in 1993. (See Schuman et 
al., 1997, for results for other events, including some exceptions to the general age-
trends, as well as effects due to other variables, such as sex.) 
In our present analysis of errors in remembering, we had two goals. First, there 
was the desire to determine whether there were age-trends, and whether these 
age- trends corresponded to the transition phase, as much had been revealed 
with the correct responses. Second, in order to gain greater insight into these 
age-trends, analyses were conducted to determine whether the ages of those 
respondents who produced errors were either less or more than those who 
produced correct responses. The first goal was accomplished by examining all 
basic, time and name error responses that had five or more cases with linear and 
quadratic logistic regression models. For each error, a dichotomous dependent 
variable was constructed based on the presence of the error or the presence of any 
other response, be it another error, a DK or a correct response. For example, in 
assessing whether an age-trend was present with inversion errors to the SRC-93 
Tet Offensive item, the presence of an inversion error received one value in the 
dichotomous variable and any other response to the Tet Offensive, whether it be a 
non-inversion error, a DK, or a correct response was assigned the other value. In 
each of the linear models, age of respondent was entered as a predictor variable 
to test whether either younger or older respondents were more likely to produce 
each error. In the quadratic models, both age and the square of age were entered 
as predictor variables to examine whether a curvilinear trend was present, and 
whether the error was more often produced by respondents within a particular 
age range. With all of the linear and quadratic models, education of respondent, a 
variable that consisted of six categories based on years of education, was included 
as a control variable. 
The second goal was accomplished by focusing on those errors that revealed 
significant age-trends, and contrasting each of these error responses against 
only correct responses using linear logistic regression models, again including 
education as a control variable.2 One possibility is that although an error may 
show a significant age-trend, the ages that commit the error may not be different 
2  Note that the regressions in the body of Tables 6 and 7 compare the ages of those making a particular 
type of error (e.g. inversion for the Tet Offensive) who score 1, with all other responses to that item 
(i.e. to the combination of correct answers, Don’t Know responses, and other types of errors) who 
score 0. However, the regressions referred to here (and in notes to Tables 6 and 7) involve a particular 
type of error in comparison to correct responses only. 
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from those who respond correctly. Such a pattern could occur, for example, when 
the same original experience was being reported incorrectly by some respondents 
but correctly by others. On the other hand, another possibility is that the ages of 
those respondents that commit the error differ significantly from those who are 
correct. This pattern could result from different original experiences, occurring at 
different times, one motivating the error and the other a correct response, or could 
result from the same original experience affecting respondents of different ages in 
different ways. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of both sets of analyses. Table 6 shows 
those errors that produced significant regression coefficients for age and/or the 
square of age with the SRC-93 data, and Table 7 shows the significant results 
for DAS-91. As can be seen, 15 errors from 7 items revealed significant age-
trends, and 2 items, Dean (SRC-93) and McCarthy (DAS-91), account for 8 of 
these errors. Negative beta- weight values in the linear models indicate that 
younger respondents more often produced the error, whereas positive values 
point to older people. The negative beta- weights in the square of age terms in 
the quadratic model indicate a curvilinear trend in which respondents who were 
middle-aged when surveyed were more likely to produce the indicated errors. 
Of primary interest are those respondent ages that correspond to producing 
particular errors. In order to gain a sense of these ages, the modal age ranges of the 
respondents who produced each significant error were computed at the time the 
target item event occurred, and at the time of those errors that indicated a datable 
event other than the target event (Korea, Rusk, Sixties and Yankee).3 Whether 
these modal ages differed significantly from correct responses are also reported in 
notes to Tables 6 and 7. The striking feature of those items that yielded significant 
age trends is that most of them (11/15, 73%) have modal ages that implicate the 
transition phase in promoting the erroneous response (Tet/Inversion, Tet/Korea, 
Woodstock/ Related, John Dean/Rusk, Marshall/Vague, Marshall/Related, Joe 
McCarthy/ Later, Joe McCarthy/Yankee, Joe McCarthy/Vague, Joe McCarthy/
Inversion, Watergate/Related). 
The errors to the Tet Offensive (see Table 6) are most instructive with respect 
to illustrating the role of the transition phase in promoting wrong responses. 
Importantly, the inversion errors are committed by respondents significantly 
younger than those who responded correctly (B = –0.053, p < 0.01), and the Korea 
3 The computation of modal age range is based on 12 class intervals for the ages of respondents, with 
each class interval except for the first (18–24) and the last (75+), encompassing 5 years (e.g. 40–44, 
45–49). The logic of this statistic is based on the fact that if each class interval consisted of respondents 
who had an equal tendency to respond with a particular error, any three class intervals would contain 
25% of these error responses, and any four class intervals would contain 33% of these error responses. 
Thus, if three adjacent class intervals (representing a span of 15 years) provide 33% of the responses, 
the respondents with those ages provide relatively more of that particular type of error response than 
respondents of other ages. Thus, the modal age range is computed from the fewest number of those 
class intervals (up to a maximum of three) that contain at least 33% of the proportional responses. By 
using proportions of frequencies within each class interval, the statistic corrects for unequal interval 
sizes. When the modal age range consists of fewer (than three) class intervals, a greater bunching 
of responses within certain ages is indicated than when the modal age range involves three class 
intervals. In addition, the 33% “rule” allows an objective means of defining whether a distribution is 
bimodal. If two non-continuous sections of a distribution contain three class intervals that accounted 
for at least 33% of the proportional responses, the distribution was considered as bimodal. Modal 
ranges were then computed for both sections of the distribution. 
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errors are committed by those significantly older (B = 0.065, p < 0.001).4 Whereas 
the inversion errors suggest that the same experience affected younger respondents 
differently than those who were correct, the Korea errors suggest that older 
respondents had a different experience in mind than those who were correct. 
Focusing on the inversion errors and that the transition phase is implicated 
in inversion errors to Joe McCarthy as well (see Table 7), the nature of this type 
of error suggests that although the transition phase may have promoted the 
remembering of the elements of these experiences, there is no guarantee that 
individuals will reconstruct the events with the correct relationship. However, 
that the Tet Offensive inversion errors are provided by respondents who were of 
younger ages during the transition phase when the event occurred in comparison 
to those respondents who were correct, whereas respondents who provided 
inversion and correct responses to Joe McCarthy represent the same transition 
phase ages as those who were correct, suggests that the inversion errors to these 
two items are not alike. One difference is that the inversion errors for Tet Offensive 
seem to be possibly motivated by an overall schematic theme (that the United 
States is a militarily powerful nation), whereas there is no apparent schematic 
theme for inversion errors to Joe McCarthy.5 The schematic characterization of 
the Tet Offensive inversion errors, which were committed by respondents who 
experienced the Tet Offensive while at early transition phase ages, is evidence 
that supports the hypothesis that early adolescence is particularly marked by 
developing expectations concerning what characterizes entities in the world 
(Duncan and Agronick, 1995; Stewart and Healy, 1989). 
The Watergate (see Table 7) and Woodstock (see Table 6) -related event errors 
are also supportive of this early adolescence hypothesis in that they are reflective 
of the use of a schematic theme to confabulate a response, and were provided by 
persons who are at younger ages within the transition phase (the Watergate errors 
are from significantly younger ages than correct responses, B = –0.072, p < 0.01, 
and the Woodstock errors are directionally from younger respondents, but not 
significantly so, B = –0.017, p = 0.16). The Watergate-related event errors appear 
to have used the general theme of government scandal to refer to some scandal 
that occurred either earlier (“Kennedy involved in some crime”) or later (“Big 
scandal in government, Reagan’s term”) than Watergate, or to construct an event 
4 Although Table 6 shows a modal age range that indicates that the respondents were at the older ages 
of the transition phase, or even older than the transition phase when experiencing Korea War events, 
this modal range fails to adequately represent the 17% of Korea War respondents between the ages of 
14 and 18 years in 1952. Korea War responses to DAS-91 Tet Offensive also suggest a transition phase 
effect. They are consistent with those of SRC-93 in approaching significance with the curvilinear trend, 
with the square of age B = –0.01, p=0.09. Also, at the time of survey, the modal age range is 50–54 
years, which corresponds to an age in 1952 of 11–16 years. There were only three Korea War responses 
to the village of Mylai item in SRC-93, which were too few to analyze with the regression models. 
5 The view that inversion errors can often be motivated by schematic reconstruction receives support 
from the five inversion errors to Rosa Parks, although these errors are not related to the transition 
phase. The inversion errors were always committed by whites, and by individuals who appeared older 
in comparison to the other respondents who had also made substantive errors to the Rosa Parks item 
(B = 0.060, p = 0.07). A reasonable interpretation is that individuals who are reporting these inversions 
are affected by a schematic impression of history that emphasizes blacks as being submissive to whites. 
For black respondents, the unusual nature of Rosa Park’s actions are remembered. For whites, and 
particularly for those who are older and in which submissiveness was more likely to be a socialized 
norm, the importance of the details are susceptible to being dominated by a schematic memory. 
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that apparently never happened at all (“Bugging the Pentagon, Nixon and his 
staff”); with Woodstock, the errors can be generally characterized as being based 
on overall themes of the 1960s, such as the peace movement (e.g. “demonstration 
against Vietnam”) or civil rights (e.g. “more freedom, women’s rights”). 
The Korea errors to the Tet Offensive are noteworthy in that error-laden 
earlier transition phase events were remembered instead of cued related events 
that occurred later in time. The Rusk errors to John Dean (see Table 6) are 
also consistent with this pattern, except that those committing the Rusk errors 
experienced both Dean Rusk and John Dean during their transition phase. Both 
errors indicate the presence of proactive interference if these respondents also 
have (or once had) correct knowledge about the Tet Offensive and John Dean. 
Since the errors were conceptually related to the target events, the claim that the 
respondents do (or did) know about the target events is quite plausible; retrieval 
attempts guided the respondents to relevant semantic categories in memory (i.e. 
Asian War, Administration Official) that would probably exist only if the target 
events also reside (or once resided) in memory. In the case of Dean Rusk, lexical 
activation of “Dean” also played a role in retrieval. Proactive interference also may 
be involved with those individuals who remembered Joe McCarthy the Yankee 
Manager instead of the intended Wisconsin Senator; it is noteworthy that Yankee 
responses were provided by an older cohort than those who responded with the 
Senator (B = 0.06, p = 0.01). The case for proactive interference is less strong here 
since the two individuals do not share category membership. Nevertheless, the 
earlier Joe McCarthy has an accessibility advantage for some individuals that may 
either be accompanied by having or not having knowledge of the Senator. 
Not all of the significant age-trends indicate a prominent role for the transition 
phase. Curiously, although there is evidence that the transition phase appears to 
promote proactive interference, there is no comparable retroactive interference 
effect. The name errors grouped under “Sixties” for McCarthy (see Table 7) 
do suggest retroactive interference in that an incorrect later individual was 
remembered instead of a correct target who had been prominent earlier in time. 
However, these respondents are reporting individuals who had been experienced 
at an age older than the transition phase, and not reporting a target individual 
who had been experienced during their transition phase. Since Paul McCartney 
is not conceptually related to the Senator Joe McCarthy, a convincing claim that 
these errors involved an actual interference with a known individual cannot be 
made. On the other hand, the political astuteness needed to remember aspects of 
the career of Eugene McCarthy is more suggestive that these individuals would 
also have knowledge of the well-known communist accuser.6 This simply must be 
one case in which processes other than transition phase effects are at work. 
There is also no clear interpretation of the tendency for persons who were older 
than the transition phase when John Dean (see Table 6) was most well-known 
to more probably respond with Vague (simply knowing Dean as an unspecified 
government figure) and Later Time (referring to an aide in Carter or Reagan 
administrations; B = 0.041, p = 0.06) errors. Interpretations become clearer for errors 
made predominately by people who were younger than the transition phase (Later 
6 Considering responses of Eugene McCarthy by themselves does yield a curvilinear trend that 
approaches significance, with the square of age B = –0.01, p = 0.08. 
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Time errors to McCarthy; B = –0.039, p < 0.01), or not yet alive (Loose Associations 
to WPA; B = –0.087, p < 0.01), when the events originally occurred (see Table 7). 
Since these individuals lack direct knowledge of the intended events, having been 
too young to encode them when they occurred, their responding reflects what 
they have learned after these events took place. The later time errors to McCarthy 
were largely based on remembering local Detroit media personalities (J. P. and 
Jack McCarthy) who were still active at the time of interview. The loose association 
errors to WPA are made by individuals who have no real idea of what the WPA 
involved, and who were simply using the acronym to construct a reasonable-
sounding response (e.g. “World Peace Assembly”). 
There were also errors to which transition phase effects could have been expected, 
but did not occur. WWII errors to Tet Offensive, Douglas MacArthur errors to Joe 
McCarthy, and James Dean errors to John Dean, all involve events that happened at 
an earlier point in time than the target events, and to which those who experienced 
the events while at their transition phase should be expected to have a better memory 
for them. Yet, although older respondents did produce these errors quite often, 
younger respondents did as well.7 These events appear to be those that continue to 
be kept alive culturally either through schooling, or through popular culture, and 
younger people may know these incorrect events better than the target events. 
General Discussion 
We have found that respondents make many types of errors in expressing their 
knowledge of public figures and events. These errors appear not as simple attempts 
to guess wildly (perhaps with the exception of uninterpretable responses), but often 
show the informed attempts of respondents to provide a correct response. In fact, 
the quasi-correct “errors,” although they reflect responses that were unintended by 
the investigators, are actually correct responses and show that survey researchers 
can fail to be sensitive to varieties of genuine knowledge that are different from their 
own. In addition, in many cases, the errors directly show that respondents were 
gaining access to relevant information that was available in semantic and lexical 
memory in the attempt to provide a meaningful response. Related events indicate 
the extent to which memory is organized along conceptual lines, and that semantic 
structure plays a role in remembering past episodes (cf., Brown, Shevell, and Rips, 
1986). Loose associations point to lexical associations and activation that play a 
role in respondent report (cf., Brown and McNeill, 1966). These searches through 
semantic and lexical memory systems may occur in parallel; it is noteworthy that 
some errors, such as retrieving a memory of Dean Rusk to the cue of John Dean, 
involve both semantic relatedness and a lexical association. Finally, inversions are 
remarkable in that respondents are able to retrieve the correct elements that are 
contained in the event but are reconstructing them in an inverted form, perhaps 
guided by an overall schematic theme. 
Additionally, the present results extend prior research (Schuman et al., 1997) 
that has shown that respondents are more knowledgeable about those events that 
7  In fact, approaching significance was a linear age-trend that indicated that younger people were 
more likely to produce a Douglas MacArthur error (B = –0.033, p = 0.06). 
206     Be lli,  Sc h u man, & Jac k S o n i n Ap pl i ed Cog n i ti ve ps y C ho l o g y 11 (1997)
occurred during the period of life that marks the transition between childhood 
and adulthood. Errors in the remembering of the past appear more likely to occur 
when transition phase events interfere with other events either proactively or 
retroactively, or when, on the basis of schematic knowledge of transition phase 
events, past events are reconstructed incorrectly or incompletely. Thus, not only 
are events that occur during the transition phase better remembered and known 
than events that occur in other phases of the lifespan, but the transition phase can 
also promote error-prone remembering. 
Given that people do know more about transition phase events, explanations of 
these effects need to center on how the transition phase promotes better memory 
and retrieval. Rubin (1995) recently offered three classes of hypotheses to account for 
transition phase effects. Cognitive accounts rely on normal cognitive processes, and 
as one possibility, would seek to account for transition phase effects as the result of 
normal, but enhanced, encoding processes that operate throughout the lifespan, but 
are more likely to occur during the transition phase. Physiological accounts argue that 
the brain is at its peak performance during the transition phase, with declines in the 
ability to encode information as one ages. Evolutionary accounts suggest that there 
is an evolutionary advantage for people to have better memory for transition phase 
events. One evolutionary account relies on the notion that cultural transmission of 
important, but otherwise forgotten, past information depends on the memory of a few 
aged individuals who can relate experiences from many years ago; another account 
in many ways complements the physiological perspective by suggesting that the 
brain is at its peak performance during the transition phase because these ages also 
correspond to the phase of the lifespan when individuals are most reproductively 
fertile, and reproductive success depends upon an active brain. 
Among the cognitive accounts, first or new experiences hypotheses have 
considerable appeal. For example, Fitzgerald (1988) argued that the transition 
phase is marked by many more new experiences that contribute to the formation 
of one’s identity in comparison to other life phases, and thus the transition phase is 
unique in that more experiences are encoded in comparison to other phases. With 
a slightly different emphasis, Fromholt and Larsen (1991) argued that the transition 
phase is marked by more life transitional events, such as “leaving school, starting a 
career, getting married, and have children” than are other life phases, and due to the 
importance, significance, and consequential character of these transitional events, 
they would be encoded more thoroughly and are thus more resistant to forgetting. 
While agreeing with Fromholt and Larsen (1991) that transitional events have a 
special place in memory, Pillemer and colleagues (Pillemer, Rhinehart, and White, 
1986; Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter, and White, 1988) focus on how transitional events 
are encoded more distinctly in memory than other events, lending to their better 
ability to be remembered. Since they are associated with new experiences that cannot 
be assimilated into pre-existing memory structures, transitional events are encoded 
as distinctive memories that begin the formation of new memory structures. In turn, 
within these new structures, transitional memories continue to service as examples 
to inform appropriate attitudes and behavior for future, but now familiar, similar 
experiences (see also Jansari and Parkin, 1996; Robinson, 1992a, 1992b). 
In some ways, our survey data support these first experience hypotheses, 
with the best example involving reports on the Tet Offensive. For individuals 
who experienced the Vietnam War during their transition phase, the events of 
Vietnam would constitute their first war experiences; on the other hand, for those 
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who experienced Vietnam after the transition phase, there would be earlier war 
memories (e.g. the Korean War) that would lend the events of Vietnam to be more 
familiar and less distinctive. Thus, those individuals who experienced the Vietnam 
War during their transition phase are more accurate than other individuals in 
reporting on the Tet Offensive (Schuman et al., 1997), whereas, as shown in the 
present results, those persons who experienced the Korean War during their 
transition phase would be more likely to refer to the Tet Offensive as an event 
from the Korean War. Less supportive of first experience accounts, but certainly 
not completely inconsistent with them, are our findings that the transition phase 
has also played a role in respondents remembering characteristics of Dean Rusk 
when cued with John Dean, or the Yankee Manager Joe McCarthy instead of the 
Wisconsin Senator. In these cases, it is not compelling to argue that the earlier 
transition phase events led the later events to become much less distinctive; John 
Dean and the Senator are quite unique personalities in the American experience 
and thus should serve as first experiences to all who have known them. Yet, it 
may be the case that the Dean Rusk responses resulted from response competition 
between two first experiences (one of Dean Rusk and the other of John Dean) 
that had received some level of activation within semantic and lexical memory 
systems, and it is quite possible that the apparent sports fans who remembered 
the Yankee manager never paid attention to political events. The accessibility 
advantages of first experiences could also lead them to retroactively interfere 
with earlier events as well. 
The inversion and confabulation errors that we found with transition phase 
reports pose challenges to all of the mentioned accounts of better transition phase 
memory. Since the physiological and evolutionary accounts are compelling only 
as explanations of better memory, there would need to be modification to explain 
less than adequate remembering of transition phase events. Regarding the first 
experiences hypotheses, the overall pattern of these errors suggested the presence 
of a reconstructive process that was based on the memory for a schematic theme. 
They also tended to be produced by individuals who were at the youngest 
transition phase ages. Stewart and Healy (1989) argued that late childhood and 
early adolescence are marked by learning about the outside environment and 
about those aspects that best characterize the different entities that make up 
the world. By this account, events that happen in the early part of the transition 
phase may only be incompletely known, eventually leading to many of the types 
of reconstructive errors we have observed. Thus, the nature of first experiences 
may not be monolithic during the entire transition phase, but rather, may differ 
depending on whether the events are experienced during late childhood or early 
adulthood. According to Stewart and Healy, identity formation does not enter the 
fore until around midstream during the transition phase. 
Of our findings, the discovery of inversion errors surprised us the most. The 
transition phase inversions observed with Joe McCarthy and the Tet Offensive are 
an indication that the greater ability to recall the components of transition phase 
events is no guarantee of accuracy. There is something quite dramatic, as in the case 
of Joe McCarthy, about being remembered as possessing those properties which 
one had abhorred and accused others of possessing. It is difficult to conceive of a 
more fundamental error. 
One advantage with this research was our ability to know the true state of 
affairs, thus allowing us to determine when a response is in error. In most of the 
208     Be lli,  Sc h u man, & Jac k S o n i n Ap pl i ed Cog n i ti ve ps y C ho l o g y 11 (1997)
work on autobiographical memory, including much of the work that illustrates 
transition phase effects, there is no ability for the researcher to test the accuracy of 
what people report. We can only speculate that inversion and other kinds of errors 
are not uncommon in the remembering of unverifiable personal past events as 
well. Just as John Dean had not been totally faithful in recounting his past (Neisser, 
1981), our findings point to the dramatic ways in which the remembering of our 
own pasts may be fraught with error. 
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